Secret store
The secret_store capability is a small, sync host primitive for storing
per-application credentials in the operating system's native secret store,
with a portable JSON file fallback for headless environments. It is
registered by the host adapter and exposed only through the nominal
HarnessSecretStore interface:
| Method | Returns |
|---|---|
harness.secret_store.get | {account, key, value, backend} |
harness.secret_store.set | {account, key, backend} |
harness.secret_store.delete | {account, key, deleted, backend} |
harness.secret_store.list | {account, keys, backend} |
value is nil when the key is absent. backend is "keyring" or
"file" so callers can surface backend status without re-deriving it.
Backend selection#
The active backend is resolved on every call (selection is essentially
free) so an env-var override takes effect without a process restart.
The default harn-hostlib feature set includes native-secret-store, which
links the platform adapters. Lean embedders that disable default features can
enable that feature explicitly or force the portable file backend.
When a native adapter is present but the current session cannot access it
(for example, a headless macOS session that cannot display an unlock prompt),
host calls fail with the typed backend_unavailable kind and a stable reason.
| OS | Default backend |
|---|---|
| macOS | Apple Keychain through apple-native-keyring-store |
| iOS | Protected Data through apple-native-keyring-store |
| Windows | Credential Manager through its keyring store crate |
| Linux / Unix | Secret Service through its keyring store crate |
| Other targets | File backend |
Forcing the file backend#
Set HARN_SECRET_STORE_BACKEND=file to use the file backend regardless of
OS. This is the right knob for sandboxed CI, eval harnesses, container
images that must not touch the user's keychain, and anything else that
needs deterministic, file-based storage.
Account namespacing#
The account argument scopes every key to the calling application
(my-app, cloud-admin, etc.) so two applications can use the same
key name without collision:
- Native keyring —
accountmaps to the ecosystem'sservicefield andkeymaps to itsuserfield. On Apple this retains the standard Keychain service/account mapping; the maintained platform adapters own the corresponding Credential Manager and Secret Service representations. - File backend — credentials land at
$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/<account>/credentials.json(or%APPDATA%\<account>\credentials.jsonon Windows). The file is written with0o600on Unix; the containing directory with0o700.
The path layout for the file backend is byte-compatible with an IDE host's
existing $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/<account>/credentials.json layout, so existing
deployments migrate without any data movement.
Scope and non-goals#
The capability owns where the bytes live and nothing else. Audit logging,
env-vs-stored precedence, schema validation beyond builtin signatures, and
migration logic belong in the .harn orchestration layer that composes
this primitive. Concretely:
- No "convenience" helpers like
effectiveValue(envKey, fallback)— the caller decides whether to readenv, the secret store, or both. - No rotation, versioning, or zeroizing buffers. Those live in
harn-vm::secrets(the asyncSecretProviderchain used by the LLM caller), which solves a different problem. - No hardware-backed key stores. Deferred to a follow-up if any consumer asks.
Verifying a setup#
HARN_SECRET_STORE_BACKEND=file ./scripts/cargo_with_worktree_build_dir.sh test -p harn-hostlib --test harn_hostlib secret_store
tests/harn_hostlib/secret_store.rs (file backend) runs on every CI runner.
tests/harn_hostlib/secret_store_os_native.rs exercises desktop native stores
end-to-end on macOS and Windows. Linux builds and uses Secret Service by
default; headless jobs should force the deterministic file backend because
they generally have no unlocked desktop session collection.